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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS IN OHIO
I. THE PROBLEM
The expansion of state agencies and the powers which they exercise,
as well as the potentially far-reaching effects of many of their decisions,
make it essential that those affected by agency decisions have a clear-cut
and effective means of timely judicial review once all administrative rem-
edies have been exhausted. Moreover, an individual adversely affected by
an agency decision in order to obtain timely relief must be able to easily
determine which legal mechanism is available to him for that purpose.
Yet, despite the existence of statutes providing, for appeal from and review
of agency decisions, the case law in this area defines no clear criteria for
deciding which mechanism of review is available. In addition, the effec-
tiveness of the relief that is available has been undermined by the con-
sistent refusal of courts to allow pre-enforcement review' of agency rules
in situations where a decision or the promulgation of a rule or order results
automatically in an injury to those affected. It is the thesis of this note
that such a situation need not continue to exist and that a recent decision
of the Ohio supreme court has taken an initial-though uncertain-step
towards providing timely review and an identifiable mechanism for obtain-
ing that review.' To demonstrate the evolution of the present situation
and to place it in perspective, the note will briefly discuss the creation of
administrative agencies in Ohio and the statutory means set forth to review
their decisions. In addition, there will be a preliminary look at the admin-
istrative rule-making process and a clarification of basic concepts involved,
in order to prepare the reader for a discussion of the case law under both
the Administrative Appeals Act' and the Administrative Procedure Act.4
The note closes by examining the most recent Ohio supreme court opinion
in the area and includes the suggestion that the Ohio Declaratory Judg-
ment Act' can be used to obtain the effective and timely relief unavailable
in the past,
1 Because it is used throughout this note and to avoid confusion, the term "pre-enforcement
review" ought to be defined at this point. It refers to the question of whether a rule or regula-
tion of an agency, at either the state or municipal level, may be attacked in court upon
being promulgated, and if so, under what circumstances. The kind of situation to which
it refers is aptly illustrated by Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Commission of Ohio,
34 Ohio St. 2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 261 (1973), discussed in text accompanying notes 80 to 91
infra.
2 Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Commission of Ohio, 34 Ohio St. 2d 93, 296
N.E.2d 261 (1973).
3 Administrative Appeals Act, OHIo REv. CoDE ANN. ch. 2506 (Page Supp. 1973).
4 Administrative Procedure Act, OHio REV. CoDE ANN. ch. 199 (Page Supp. 1972).
s Declaratory Judgment Act, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. ch. 2721 (Page Supp. 1972).
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II. CREATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES:
THEIR THEORY AND OPERATION
A. The Theory
It has been stated that our democracy's "chief contribution to the sci-
ence of government is the principle of the complete separation of the three
departments of government, executive, legislative and judicial." 6  How-
ever, the Ohio constitution does not contain an express provision prevent-
ing each branch of government from exercising the powers allocated to
the others,' and, indeed, the doctrine of separation of powers in Ohio is
not total. For example, the governor is usually a legislative leader of
sorts, with the power to convoke the General Assembly as well as the
power to exercise a veto over legislation. One major reason for the partial
relaxation of the doctrine is that the functions of government have rapidly
expanded and have grown exceedingly technical and complex.'
The Ohio constitution provides that no law shall be passed to take
effect upon the approval of any authority other than that of the General
Assembly. 10 However, increased government complexity and expansion
have made it necessary for the various branches to delegate some of their
powers." Initially, this delegation is distinguished from the actual power
to enact laws as follows:
The true distinction, therefore, is, between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the latter no valid objection can be made.12
The basic rationale for delegation is in large part the belief that agen-
cies, which in Ohio include municipalities and other political subdivisions
6 State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 187, 124 N.E. 172, 177 (1919).
7 This is also true of the United States Constitution. Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87,
119 (1925).
8 The General Assembly is, however, prohibited from exercising judicial power not expressly
conferred by the Constitution. OHIo CONST. art. II, § 32.
9 For the history of the doctrine in Ohio, see A History of Separation of Powers in
Ohio: A Study in Administrative Law, 13 U. CiN. L. REV. 191 (1939).
'
0
o Omo CoNsT. art. II, § 26.
" "It would not be necessary to go beyond the confines of Ohio to find scores of instances
wherein one branch of government has been invested with the powers of another." Ex parte
Bevan, 126 Ohio St. 126, 135, aff'd sub nom. Bevan v. Krieger, 289 U.S. 459 (1933).
12 Cincinnati, W. & Z. RR. v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77, 88-89 (1852). However,
this sharp distinction may have blurred somewhat with the passage of time as "[gjradually our
legislative bodies developed the system of legislating only the main outlines of programs re-
quiring constant attention, and leaving to administrative agencies the tasks of working out
subsidiary policies." K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 1.05 (3d ed. 1972). Indeed
it has been said that ".... the old doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative Jpower has
virtually retired from the field and given up the fight." Address by Senator Root, American
Bar Association Annual Meeting, August 30, 1916; 2 A.B.A.J. 736, 749 (1916).
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as well as the state administrative agencies, would bring more expertise
to bear on a problem in highly technical or highly localized situations,
thus giving rise to wiser, more responsive, and. more efficient government
at both the state and local level. 3 Often these agencies are hybrid organi-
zations14 in that they sometimes function in a legislative capacity, some-
times in a judicial capacity, and sometimes in both capacities simultane-
ously.15 They promulgate rules, pass ordinances, issue orders, administer
statutes and make other decisions which affect large numbers of people
in diverse areas and occupations. The primary focus of this note will
be on judicial review of their rule-making functions. When these func-
tions operate to deprive a person of his rights, properties, or freedoms,
the General Assembly has provided various mechanisms through which
an injured party can challenge both the procedure of the rule-making pro-
cess and the substance of the rule itself.16
B. The Operation
1. Political Subdivisions Within The State
The Ohio constitution provides that "Any municipality may frame and
adopt or amend a charter for its government and may, subject to the provi-
sions of section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder all powers of local
self-government.' 7  Section 3 states that, "Municipalities shall have au-
thority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and
enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar
regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws."' 8
The purpose of these home rule provisions in the Ohio constitution
is to add to the governmental stature and capability of Ohio municipal
governments.' 9 The premise of these provisions is that local matters can
be better handled by local government, since the local government Is closer
to the needs of the electorate than is the state legislature, and presumably
has a superior knowledge of the problems peculiar to the locality.20 As
's Const. Convention of Ohio of 1912, Proceedings and Debates, Vol. II, 1433, 1441,
1471, 1484.
14 They have been referred to as a "fourth branch" of the government. FTC v. Ruberoid
Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952); Rep. Pres. Comm. Ad. Mgt. 40 (1937).
15 This ability to act in more than one capacity seemingly violates the doctrine of separation
of powers. Id.
11GSee, e.g., OHro REv. CODE ANN. § 2506.01 (Page Supp. 1972); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 119.11 (Page 1969); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page 1969); and OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2721.03 (Page Supp. 1972).
17 OHIO CONST. art. XVII, § 7.
18 OHio CONSr. art. XVIII, § 3.
lb Const. Convention of 1912, Proceedings and Debates, Vol. II, 1433; Billings v. Cleveland
Ry., 92 Ohio St. 473, 111 N.E. 155, 156 (1915).
20 Const. Convention of Ohio of 1912, Proceedings and Debates, Vol. II, 1433, 1441,
1471, 1484.
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a result, these sections of the Ohio Constitution vest in municipalities broad
power and discretion to make decisions and enact ordinances.21 The ex-
pressed legislative intent as well as the interpretive case law makes it clear
that municipal ordinances and decisions are to be given the force and ef-
fect of law.2 Since the promulgators of municipal ordinances act in a
legislative capacity, their actions are classified as quasi-legislative. 8 How-
ever, not all municipal actions are "quasi-legislative" in function; some
are "quasi-judicial," involving the determination of various matters in an
adjudicative proceeding of some kind. In 1957, the General Assembly
enacted Revised Code § 2506.01 to provide for review of all municipal
decision-making. Revised Code § 2506.01 provides:
Every final order, adjudication, or decision of any officer, tribunal, au-
thority, board, bureau, commission, department or other division of any po-
litical subdivision of the state may be reviewed by the common pleas court
The appeal... is in addition to any other remedy of appeal provided by
law.
A final order, adjudication, or decision does not include ... any order
which does not constitute a determination of the rights, duties, privileges,
benefits, or legal relationships of a specified person .... 24
2. State Administrative Agencies
Whenever the General Assembly enacts legislation to enable the crea-
tion of a new state agency,25 it will generally define the parameters of
the duties of the agency in the legislation itself, in order to provide the
agency with an operational framework. The rules and decisions of these
agencies have come more and more to dominate many aspects of our day-
to-day lives. Mr. Justice Jackson has made this observation:
21Id.
22 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Vuenther, 281 U. S. 34 (1930); Dayton
v. Adams, 9 Ohio St. 2d 79, 223 N.E.2d 602 (1967); State ex 'eL Leach v. Redick, 168
Ohio St. 543, 147 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d
854 (1957); Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919); Fitzgerald v.
Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913); State ex rel. Pecyk v. Greene, 102 Ohio
App. 297, 114 N.E.2d 922 (1953). But see Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 49
N.E.2d 412 (1943); Village of Brewster v. Hill, 128 Ohio St. 354, 191 N.E. 366 (1934).
28 At this point no attempt will be made to define either "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-
judicial." Suffice it to note that:
Administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or quasi-
judicial, as the occasion required, in order to validate their functions within the
separation-of-powers scheme of the Constitution. The mere retreat to the qualifying
"quasi" is implicit with confession that all recognized classifications have broken down,
and "quasi" is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use a
counterpane to conceal a disordered bed.
FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952).
24 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2506.01 (Page Supp. 1972).
25 There are currently some eighty agencies covered by the Administrative Procedure Act.
Note, A Survey of the Ohio Administrative Procedures Act, 22 CLEvE. ST. L. REV. 320 (1973).
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The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant
legal trend of the last century and perhaps more values today are affected
by their decisions than by those of all the courts, review of administrative
decisions apart.26
However, with this expansion of power and responsibility comes a concom-
itant need to guard against a parallel expansion of potential abuse of pow-
er. The concepts of separation of powers and of checks and balances
within our system of government are not readily applied to administrative
agencies, which at times function in a quasi-judicial fashion and at times
in a quasi-legislative fashion and at times in neither. Speaking to this
problem, Elihu Root warned that "If we continue a government of limited
powers, these agencies of regulation must themselves be regulated ...
The rights of a citizen against them must be made plain. 27
In Ohio, attempts to make these rights "plain" are found in several
places. The Ohio constitution provides that "the courts of common pleas
have original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and such powers of
review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be
provided by law."2 The Ohio Administrative Procedure Act [APA]29 spe.
cifically allows appeal from adverse orders of agencies in "adopting,
amending, or rescinding a rule... on the ground that said agency failed
to comply with the law . . . or that the rule as adopted or amended by
the agency is unreasonable or unlawful. . . ."30 Revised Code § 119.11
further provides that the filing of a notice of appeal operates "as a stay
of the effective date" of the order of the agency.3' The hearing is "based
upon the arguments, briefs of counsel, and the transcript of the record
of proceedings as transmitted by the agency."2 The Ohio APA also pro-
vides for appeal by "any party adversely affected" by an agency order "is-
sued pursuant to an adjudication. 33
26 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952); "the administrative process affects
nearly every one in many ways nearly every day." K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExT §
1.02 (3d ed. 1972).
27Address by Senator Root, American Bar Association Annual Meeting, August 30, 1916,
2 A.B.AJ. 736, 750 (1916).
2 8 0HO CoNsT. art. IV, § 4(B).
29 Administrative Procedure Act, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. ch. 119 (Page Supp. 1972).
30 0omo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.11 (Page 1969).
31 Id.
82 Id.
33 The court may affirm the order of the agency, complained of in the appeal if it finds,
upon consideration of the entire record and such additional evidence as the court has
admitted, tht the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
and is in accordance with law.
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page 1969) (emphasis added).
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III. AGENCY ACTIONS:
THE PROCESS AND SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES
A. The Process: A HypotheticalM
4
A small group of men enters a municipal government office; each man
takes his seat around a conference table. A staff aid enters the room
and hands each participant in the conference a report summarizing the
views presented at a recent public hearing. 5 In addition to the summary,
each member of the group is given the staff aid's recommendation that
service of the county's public transportation system be cut in half. The
summary of views states that of 100 people testifying at the public hear-
ing, only one was in favor of cutting the service and that the one was
a county official who testified that economic reasons necessitated a cut-
back. The group reads the report, takes a vote, and publishes its finding.
The Vote is in favor of the cut-back.
That segment of the public which depends upon public transportation
is outraged. Looking to the courts for relief, one of these persons ag-
grieved challenges the cut-back by way of appeal. As will be seen, for
the plaintiff to convince a court to hear the appeal is no easy task; however,
-we shall assume that this plaintiff was luckier than some. In its hearing,
the court will look to determine if the small group of men has abused
its discretion. The rule which the court will apply to make this determina-
tion limits the court's power to questioning whether the action was arbi-
trary or whether it was not supported by substantial evidence. 6 The court
then rules that because the action taken by these men is quasi-legislative
in nature, relief cannot be granted to the plaintiff at this proceeding, In
3 4 The following model was adapted from Comment, Quasi-Legislative Acts of Local Ad'
ivinistrative Agencies: Judicial Review, 7 S. FRAN. L. REv. 111 (1972). It is not intended
as an all-inclusive example of how agency decisions are reached. Rather, it is presented
merely as an illustration depicting the possible abuses in the rule-making process.
35Not all rule-making is preceded by a public hearing. The form of the proceeding,
if any, in the municipality area is delineated by the municipal charter. State agencies are
required by statute to provide for a public hearing, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 119.03 (Page
1969). The Federal APA provides only for notice and comment before promulgation of
rules, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
36 It is questionable whether even this rule has been applied in those few instances where
the Ohio courts have reviewed agency rule-making. Long v. Division of Watercraft, 118
Ohio App. 369, 195 N.E.2d 128 (1963); In re Board of Liquor Control's Amendments,
115 Ohio App. 243, 184 N.E.2d 767 (1961). Indeed it may be that a court will not make
the determination at all, see State ex rel. Park Inc. Co. v. B.T.A., 31 Ohio St. 2d 183,
285. N.E.2d 356 (1972); and State ex rel. Lynch v. Rhodes, 176 Ohio St. 251, 199 N.E.2d
393 (1964). It may be that the question is properly addressed to an executive authority
like the attorney general or the civil service board, rather than the court of common pleas,
State ex rel. Draper v. Wilder, 145 Ohio St. 447, 62 N.E.2d 156 (1945), because there
is no defendant. It may also be a rule that is not subject to appeal, Craun Transp. v. P.U.C.,
162 Ohio St. 9, 120 N.E.2d 436 (1954), or a rule that is reviewed and upheld, Kroger Baking
v. Glander, 149 Ohio Sr. 120 (1948), 77 N.E.2d 92.1, or a rule that is reviewed and held inap-
plicable, Pottery Inc. v. County 149 Ohio St. 89, 77 N.E.2d 608 (1948). Thus it may be un-
timely to ask any questions. The scope of review may be for abuse of discretion or for error of
law, including defect in procedure, such as no evidence to support the agency's rule.
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effect, the court has told the person aggrieved by the agency action that
the single county official gave sufficient evidence, despite the 99 people
who opposed his position, to affirm the action taken in cutting back the
service.
The hypothetical just presented is perhaps overdrawn in some respects.
However, it is not intended to describe the entirety of agency decision-
making in the state; rather its purpose is to introduce the reader in a
preliminary fashion to a procedure that may take place and to the extreme-
ly difficult problems a person aggrieved faces in challenging any agency
decision. A more detailed look at the basic concepts in the area will
give more precise meaning to the events in the hypothetical and will also
serve to give the reader the background necessary to understand the dis-
cussion of the case law which follows.
B. The Basic Principles
This note discusses problems in challenging the rule-making decisions
of a municipal agency and of a state administrative agency. While the
two methods of challenge are embodied in different statutes and are dis-
cussed separately in this note, the difficulties faced by the challenger under
each statute are interrelated to a large extent, with only a change in focus
as one moves from the municipality's rule-making to the state administra-
tive agency's rule-making.
Like the problem faced by the challenger of a state administrative
agency rule, the difficulty with respect to the challenge of a municipal
agency's rule is not the absence of an opportunity to challenge but some-
thing more subtle. At the center of the difficulty is a lack of clarity as
to what the challenger must do to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction
of the common pleas court and to state a claim for relief cognizable in
that court. If a person wants to challenge any agency ruling, his ability
to do so turns upon whether or not the court labels the agency's decision-
making proceeding as quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial. 87 If the classifica-
tion is quasi-legislative, then the court will not undertake to review the
agency decision, unless the action has first been challenged at the municipal
level in a "judicial" proceeding. However, the elements which qualify
a decision for classification as quasi-legislative are less than clear. In addi-
tion, not all municipalities have a review proceeding available. If the
municipality does not provide such a remedy, the aggrieved party's avenues
3 7 The terms quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial are admittedly imprecise. See note 23
supra. However, as they are the terms used by the courts, they will be used throughout
this note. In rough fashion, the distinction attempted to be drawn is that between an adversary,
much like a court's fact finding proceeding, and a non.adversary proceeding, much like a
legislature's fact finding. However, as will be shown, making the distinction is often a difficult
task due to the lack of acceptable definition by the courts. See, e.g., M.J. Kelly Co. v. CleMeland,
32 Ohio St. 2d 15, 290 N.E.2d 562 (1972), discussed in text accompanying notes 50 to 61
infra.
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of challenge are limited either to some form of general equitable relief
or to the use of the Ohio Declaratory Judgment Act.8 The most signifi-
cant problem for such a challenger is not the absence of a method of
invoking the jurisdiction of the court but rather the difficulty in choosing
the proper method of stating a claim for relief. In other words, the focus
in the municipal area is the absence of any workable criteria telling a
plaintiff what kind of relief to ask for to obtain the judicial review which
is-somewhere--available. The absence of such functional criteria has
the effect of rendering the review process, in a large number of cases,
almost illusory, since the plaintiff is often forced to start down several
roads before he finds the proper avenue to relief. Such a Kafkaesque state
of affairs is inefficient because there is no certain procedure to precisely
allocate time, money, and judicial resources. It is also frustrating and
unnecessary.
When a state administrative agency's rule is being attacked in court;
the focus is not so much on finding the proper method of challenge as
on the timing of the relief which is available to the aggrieved party and
the lack of an effective method of pre-enforcement challenge. The prob-
lem is not that there is no review of a state administrative agency's rule-
making; there will be, sooner or later. To be sure, if the rule is actually
enforced, the party against whom it was enforced can immediately seek
relief.8 9 However, there are a number of situations in which the mere
promulgation of the rule results in an irreparable injury to those affected.
Here there is a need for pre-enforcement review because of the time lag
between the injury caused by the rule and the ability of the plaintiff to
seek relief from that injury. The affected party needs to have the rule's
applicability to him clarified so that he may structure his conduct accord-
ingly. In a given case, the plaintiff may or may not know if his actions
would place him in violation of the rule. It may be that he would have
to break the rule to determine its scope, or he may be forced to refrain
from acting in what would be a perfectly legal fashion because he does
not know what is proscribed. Taken to its extremes, this latter proposition
may be the most damaging, as the sanctions imposed for violation of the
rule may be so onerous in the view of the class of persons affected that
no one will want to risk imposition of the rule to determine its scope.
In such a case, there would be no challenge at all, due to the lack of
an effective pre-enforcement review mechanism.
40
38 Declaratory Judgment Act, OHio REV. CODE ANN. ch. 2721 (Page Supp. 1972).
3 90OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page 1969).
40 The above discussion has used the terms "review" and "appeal." When a court deter-
mines the legality of agency action through review, it functions as a court of first impression
and is, as such, not limited in the scope of its review to any record compiled by any other
authority. Appeal on the other hand presupposes some kind of prior proceeding giving review
at a lower level - here review at the administrative level. The revieweing court must
depend upon the record presented to it from that lower body.
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IV. THE CASE LAW
A. The Beginning Point: Zangerle v. Evatt41
On June 27, 1939, the Tax Commissioner adopted Rule Number
2, establishing the classification of property used in the refining of petro-
leum. This rule would have reclassified refinery structures belonging to
several major oil companies from real property to personalty. The auditors
of the counties where the properties of the oil companies were situated
applied to the Board of Tax Appeals of the Department of Taxation for
review of the rule. That Board found that Rule Number 2 was reason-
able; thereafter, the auditors invoked revisory jurisdiction42 and appealed
to the Ohio supreme court.43
The supreme court dismissed the appeal and refused to review the
legality of the rule. Although the actual basis for the decision is unclear,
the court's opinion does contain two separate rationales: first, the court
stated that passage of the rule in question was a quasi-legislative act and
therefore not appealable; second, the court indicated that the parties ap-
pealing the rule, the county auditors, did not have standing, and that there
was thus no "justiciable case or controversy. '44
The court, in part, based the distinction between quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative actions on statutory language. However, a clearly articu-
lated reason for why the conclusion that appeal is precluded should follow
from the distinction never appears. In addition, the factors requiring the
distinction itself never appear with sufficient clarity to allow one to identify
in a given case whether or not the action arose out of a quasi-judicial
or quasi-legislative proceeding.
The court also held that the proper parties, the companies whose prop-
erties were to be reclassified, were not before the court. Given this ratio-
4 139 Ohio St. 563, 41 N.E.2d 369 (1942).
42 The supreme court shall have "such revisory jurisdiction of the proceedings of adminis-
trative officers as may be conferred by law . . ." OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2. This provision
was the predecessor of OHIo CONsT. art. IV, § 4(B). See text accompanying note 28 supra.
43 Appeal was specifically allowed from the Board's decision by statute:
The proceeding to obtain reversal, vacation, or modification shall be by appeal to the
supreme court of Ohio.
Appeals from decisions of the board of tax appeals determining appeals from final
determinations by the tax commissioner . . . may be instituted: ... by the county
auditor ...
G.C. § 5611-2 (Page 1945).
4 4 These concepts are not easily definable. Both the concepts of "standing" and "justiciable
case or controversy" are used to permit a court to refuse to entertain jurisdiction. The reasons
for such refusals include: political question; ripeness; mootness; lack of adequate presentation
of the issues; public policy; exhaustion of remedies. The most recent pronouncements have
'broadened the concepts by requiring only that: (1) the challenged action has caused the plaintiff
injury in fact, and (2) that the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably
within the zone to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
1973]
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nale for the opinion, Zangerle could be explained on the basis of a lack
of standing. If so, it would then be possible to consider the court's inartic-
ulate distinction between quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial agency actions
as dictum. However, in Zangerle, the appeal was taken by the auditors
under General Code § 5611-,2, and although the court makes no mention
of it, the auditors were in fact specifically named in that statute as the
proper parties to bring the appeal. Therefore, the decision does not clearly
rest upon a lack of standing either. In short, the opinion is less than a
model of clarity, and much of the uncertainty which exists today arises
out of the confusion as to what Zangerle says and why.
Subsequent to Zangerle, it was assumed that only quasi-judicial pro-
ceedings could be appealed and that rule-making was quasi-legislative and,
therefore, not appealable. However, the possibility that the Administrative
Appeals Act or the Administrative Procedure Act did authorize pre-enforce-
ment review of the validity of rules was a very real one.45 What happened
to that possibility is discussed next.
B. Review Under the Administrative Appeals Act
1. Tuber v. Perkins4"
Tuber concerned an appeal from an amendment of a zoning plan by
the Board of Township Trustees of Boardman Township. The appeal
was taken pursuant to R.C. § 2506.01. The majority of the court, citing
Zangerle held that the enactment of zoning regulations was a "legislative"
action. The concurring opinions in Tuber reached the same result as the
was an application of the first rationale of Zangerle to municipal agency
action. The concurring opinions in Tuber reached the iame result as the
majority; however, they based their conclusion in part on the lack of a
justiciable case or controversy.47 Furthermore, they stated that "The res-
olution . . . did not affect a 'specified person' or persons," 48 and that "the
resolution changing the zone did not, in itself, adversely affect the rights
of the appellants .... In other words, the attempted appeal . was pre-
mature." 49
Therefore, Tuber made it clear that "legislative" actions were not to
be reviewable under the Administrative Appeals Act. However, it re-
mained to be seen what the court meant by the term "legislative" action
in this context.
45 Glander, Tax Administration and Procedure in Ohio, 11 OHIO ST. L.J. 127, 141 (1950).
But see, 24 U. CIN. L. REv. 163, 172 (1955).
466 Ohio St. 2d 155, 216 N.X.2d 877 (1966).
471d. at 158, 216 N.E.2d at 879-80.
48 Id, 216 N.E.2d at 880.
4 9d.,216 N.E.2d at 880.
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2. M.J. Kelly Co. v. Cleveland0
The Cleveland City Council enacted Ordinance Number 1779-69, ef-
fective November 11, 1969, authorizing the Director of Public Utilities
to contract for improvements and additions to certain utility facilities. The
ordinance said the contract was to go to the "lowest responsible bidder
under competitive bidding." Ordinance Number 1.4501 of Cleveland
required that contracts over $3,500 could be awarded only with the ap-
proval of the Board of Control, which consisted of the mayor and the
directors of the several city departments. On May 20, 1970, the Board
of Control adopted Resolution Number 246-70 authorizing the Director
of Public Utilities to contract with Henry B. Sherman, Inc. for a bid of
$154,690. Kelly Co. had submitted a bit for $123,029 and, therefore,
objected to the award of the contract to Sherman, Inc. As a result, Kelly
Co. appealed pursuant to R.C. § 2506.01.
The Kelly opinion began with an express reference to the first branch
of Zangerle:
Inasmuch as only quasi-judicial proceedings of administrative officers and
agencies are now appealable pursuant to Section 4(B), Article IV, it fol-
lows that in order for an administrative act to be appealable under R.C.
2506.01 such act must be the product of quasi-judical proceedings. 51
It must be stressed that there was no doubt here that a case or controversy
existed or that Kelly Co. had standing.52 Therefore, the court's inquiry
was limited to deciding whether or not the municipal action was legisla-
tive or quasi-judicial in nature.
In deciding that question, the court adopted a test from a Colorado
case5" in an attempt to define a quasi-judicial act. That test consisted of
determining " 'whether the function under consideration involves the exer-
cise of discretion and requires notice and hearing,' all elements 'being re-
quired to constitute a quasi-judicial act."54 The court then found that the
Board was not required to give notice to the bidders, who were also not
required to be present at the meeting. No testimony was required, and
no formal hearing had to be held. In fact, no notice had been given,
Kelly Co. had not been present,55 no witnesses had been examined, and
no hearing had been held.55 The court concluded that "such a procedure
50 32 Ohio St. 2d 150, 290 N.E. 2d 562 (1972).
51 Id. at 153, 290 N.E.2d at 564.
52 Federal cases almost directly in point have held that a low bidder has standing to
challenge rejection of his bid. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d
1137, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
53Englewood v. Daily, 158 Colo. 356, 361, 407 P.2d 325, 327 (1965).
54 32 Ohio St. 150, 152, 290 N.E.2d 562, 564 (1972).
55No indication is given if the successful bidder was present or not.
56 32 Ohio St. 150, 154, 290 N.E.2d 562, 565 (1972).
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obviously lacks elements which are essential to a quasi-judicial proceed-
ing.""7 Therefore, since the action of the Board of Control did not result
from quasi-judicial proceeding, it was not appealable under the Adminis-
trative Appeals ActY8
Assuming that a distinction between quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
acts of agencies makes sense as a basis for denying review by appeal, the
hethod which Kelly adopted to make that distinction cannot withstand
close scrutiny. The Kelly court misapplied the test it appropriated from
the Colorado decision. Since Kelly Co. was the lowest bidder, the only
"apparent" reason for its not receiving the contract was that it was not
a "responsible bidder." Such a determination is clearly a question of fact,
best determined in an adversary contest. Therefore, the due process prin-
ciples applicable to adversary hearings ought to have been required in de-
ciding whether Kelly Co. was responsible. The court, in giving its answer
to the question before it, looked only to the form by which the decision
was made and not to whether or not the due process elements ought to
have been present. Even assuming such an approach is proper, the focus
should be on whether the procedure has the necessary safeguards. And
if it does not, as it did not in this case, judicial scrutiny should be intensi-
fied rather than withheld.-" In Kelly, the court found that the determina-
tion was made in the absence of any elements of due process, and the clear
inference is that, as a result of that fact, the Board was acting in a legisla-
tive capacity. The court therefore felt it could not intervene. However,
if the court is inclined to defer to agency discretion, it would be more logi-
cal to do so only when the agency itself provides some internal safeguards
from possible arbitrary and unlawful decisions.60 A proceeding in which an
agency disclaims all due process requirements-i.e. notice, witnesses, a rec-
ord, and a hearing-does not give rise to circumstances in which a court
should automatically acquiesce in the agency's determination. Indeed, the
primary motivation in Ohio for the passage of statutes providing for judi-
cial review of administrative decisions was to prevent denials of due process
due to agency abuse of power.6'
However, while the decision in Kelly does indirectly increase the poten-
tial for abuse of agency power, it is not so much the potential for abuse
(which will always exist) that matters for purposes of this discussion as
it is the failure of the opinion in Kelly to articulate a sensible and workable
571d. at 154, 290 N.E.2d at 565.
'8 Id., 290 N.E.2d at 565.
59 "Even when the procedure is wholly informal and even when the action is directed
to a single party, the difference between fair informal procedure and lack of it should be
taken into account." K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIV LAW TExT § 2.06 (3d ed. 1972). See also
id. at § 2.08 indicating that "state courts are moving toward more emphasis on safeguards."
60Id. at § 2.08.
61 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1889); Hocking -Valley Ry. v.
Public Utilities Comm'n, 92 Ohio St. 9, 14, 110'N.E. 521, 523 (1915).
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standard which tells an aggrieved party when appeal is his remedy and
when it is not. The Kelly standard is neither sensible nor workable be-
cause it looks to whether the elements of due process accorded in a judi-
cial proceedings were in fact present and not to whether, because of the
kind of situation facing the municipal agency, those procedural safeguards
ought to have been present.
3. Haught v. Dayton62
Dayton Civil Service Rule 24 provides that "whenever . . . for any
reason a layoff is necessary ... the employees to be laid off shall be those
. . . who have the least service time in positions affected." When the
operating revenue of the City of Dayton declined in 1971, it became neces-
sary to lay off 52 firefighters in September. They were reinstated subse-
quently, but a further decline in revenues made it necessary to lay off 15
firefighters the following February. These 15 were selected despite their
seniority, while the original 52 were kept on the job. Ten of the 15
sued to enjoin their being laid off. They relied upon the above rule requir-
ing layoff by seniority, but this rule had been amended on February 9
to protect the 52.
The City Charter provides for an appeal from a dismissal to the Civil
Service Board, and R.C. § 2506.01 provides for an appeal from the Board
to the court of common pleas. It. was held that an injunctive suit would
not lie because the Charter appeal and R.C. § 2506.01 constitute an ade-
quate remedy at law. Thus, the 15 were required to seek a hearing before
the Board to review their dismissal pursuant to the amendment of the
rule before any appeal could be taken under R.C. § 2506.01.
The result in Haught is not a bad result, given the facts before the
court. There is nothing wrong with conserving judicial resources by re-
quiring exhaustion of all administrative remedies before taking an appeal
to the courts. What Haught does is instruct the lawyer that he must
make a trial record before the agency in a quasi-judicial proceeding-if
the agency is competent to hold such a trial-and not make that record
initially in the court of common pleas. This may, viewed abstractly, be
a derogation of "judicial" power. However, the courts derogate the judi-
cial power with respect to other specialized competence, e.g., in the work-
men's compensation area, and there is no reason not to adopt a similar pro-
cedure here. But a more difficult question-for which there is no immediate
answer-is what has happened to the judicial power and its availability to
the aggrieved party if the agency has no duty to provide a trial hearing
record? The question cannot be readily answered because the present set
of precedents (Kelly and Haught), if read together, have left such a con-
fusing legacy that a person aggrieved cannot identify, unless his facts fit
62 34 Ohio St. 2d 32, 295 N.X.2d 404 (1973).
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squarely within the factual patterns of these precedents, where his relief
lies.
This confusion regarding the proper method of seeking relief is both
illustrated and compounded by Haught. In Haught, the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the validity of the amended rule itself, not their dismissal under
the rule. The court of appeals recognized that the plaintiffs' challenge
was to the rule, and said that equitable relief was the proper remedy to
seek because, under Kelly, R.C. § 2506.01 does not present a prbcedure
by which an amendment of the civil service rules may be challenged. How-
ever, the Ohio supreme court, while agreeing that R.C. § 2506.01 cannot
be used to challenge such a rule, said that due to the existence of the
quasi-judicial remedy available at the administrative level, it was improper
to challenge the amended rule itself. Rather, the court stated that the
plaintiffs ought to have challenged the dismissal pursuant to the amended
rule.68
This holding would have presented no problems if there in fact had
been a principled way for a plaintiff to determine whether he ought to
challenge the rule or the dismissal. However, the real difficulty is that
there were really no guidelines prior to Haught, and no really clear stand-
ards after Haught, for the plaintiff to use to decide whether to challenge
the rule or the dismissal. He is left to guesswork, with no definite criteria
on which to base his guess. In Haught, the proceedings in which the rule
was amended were, according to the Kelly formulation, quasi-legislative,
because there were none of the elements which, under Kelly, must in fact
be present to have a quasi-judicial proceeding. Therefore, since the amend-
ment process in Haught was quasi-legislative, Zangerle, Tuber, and Kelly
all indicate that R.C. § 2506.01 is not available as the procedural mecha-
nism for relief.
The challenger's problem thus arises in a situation in which the
Haught facts are slightly altered, and it arises because Haught is unclear
as to how broad or narrow the contours of its holding are. This is so
because it is unclear under Haught when the remedy at law would be
inadequate, thus allowing the challenger to seek equitable relief. Further-
more, if equitable relief is not available through injunctive proceedings
and a remedy at law under R.C. § 2506.01 is not available, the plaintiff
does not know how to proceed in order to state his claim. In addition,
there is a further unanswered question, perhaps more frustrating than the
rest. It is clear under Haught that if the enabling statute or the ordinance
provides for some form of "judicial" review at the administrative level,
the plaintiff must first exhaust that remedy before he can invoke the juris-
diction of a common pleas court. However, it remains unclear whether
or not a plaintiff must follow this procedure if the agency, absent a man-
63Id. at 35,-295 N.E.2d at 406.
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date from its enabling charter, independently established a review mecha-
nism at the administrative level. Whether such "judicial" proceedings fall
with the scope of Haught is left unanswered, and again the plaintiff is
without a dearly defined way to proceed.
The list of unanswered questions could go on, depending upon how
one reads Kelly, or how one reads Haught, or how one reads Kelly and
Haught together. That the courts have, in an unprincipled application
of the unclear holdings found in the case law, exalted form over substance
is unarguable. At best such a method of adjudication ignores the underly-
ing value in Ohio Civil Rule 2,64 which states that substance is to be
emphasized over form when a party seeks relief. 'The practical resuit of
this confusing set of precedents is that a party attempting to challenge
a municipal agency action is presented with a frustrating trial and error
method of determining how to seek his relief. The more difficult it is
for the party aggrieved to determine the proper method for seeking relief,
the more difficult it becomes to obtain effective relief. The more difficult
it is to obtain effective relief, the greater the chance that abuses of agency
power will go unchecked. While at present there is no evidence of wide-
spread abuse of agency power, the situation after Kelly-Haught presents
unneeded roadblocks to checking such abuse if and when it arises.
C. Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act65
As has been discussed, the uncertainty caused by Zangerle's application
to the municipal agency area is significant. In many ways, the disorder
caused by Zangerle's application and the way in which that disorder has
evolved present more serious difficulties in the area of state administrative
agency rule-making because the legislature initially provided for an express
mechanism for review of such rules.66 However, the statute which was
intended to accomplish this review makes no distinction, on its face, be-
tween quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial rule-making. Nevertheless, as
mentioned at the beginning of this note, the Ohio supreme court has
placed a significant limiting gloss on this statutory language; in addition
that gloss itself may well have been, through judicial interpretation, incor-
porated into an amendment to the Ohio constitution.
1. Fortner v. Thomas67
On April 12, 1966, the Ohio Liquor Control Commission adopted
Regulation LGc-1-52 which amended Regulation 52. This amendment
imposed responsibility on a permit holder for acts of "his agent, or em-
6 4 01o Civ. RULE 2.
65 Administrative Procedure Act, OHo REV. CODE ANN. ch. 119 (Page Supp. 1972).
66 Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 119.11 (Page 1969).
67 22 Ohio St. 2d 13, 257 N.E.2d 371 (1970).
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ployee" in allowing "improper conduct of any kind" on or about the li-
censed premises. Violation of the regulation could result in the suspension
or revocation of a holder's liquor permit.
Fortner, the challenger of the rule, was never subjected to the imposi-
tion of the regulation. If he had been charged with a violation of the
regulation, he undoubtedly could have challenged its validity in an enforce-
ment proceeding. Furthermore, assuming he was convicted of a violation,
he could have appealed the conviction to the courts and challenged the
conviction pursuant to R.C. § 119.12.68 However, the amended regulation
left substantial doubt as to what conduct constituted a violation of the
regulation.69 Therefore, until the regulation was interpreted (most likely
through enforcement proceedings) a "chilling effect" existed which oper-
ated on' the permit holders uncertain of the conduct proscribed. Fortner,
a holder of a permit issued by the Department of Liquor Control, chal-
lenged the lawfulness, reasonableness, and constitutionality of the regula-
tion by way of appeal pursuant to R.C. § 119.11.70
The reasoning in Fortner was two-fold: first, that R.C. § 119.11 could
not be used to review quasi-legislative proceedings of state administrative
agencies; and, second, that the case did not present a justiciable case or
controversy. In other words, Fortner adopts both branches of Zangerle
and applies them expressly to state administrative agency rule-making.
Indeed, in approving and following Zangerle, the Fortner opinion quotes
extensively from Zangerle.
In addition to the two-fold rationale already discussed, the Zangerle
court's opinion also gave special significance to the use of the word "pro-
ceedings" in the Ohio constitution. It concluded that "proceedings" meant
quasi-judicial proceedings only. Similarly the court in Fortner focused up-
on the use of the word "proceedings" in the 1968 amendment to article
IV, section 4(B) of the Ohio constitution, which was interpreted to mean
that "the framers of the constitutional amendment intended to maintain
the impact of... [Zangerle] and following decisions in the area of judi-
cial review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies."'"
The court, however, had still to deal in a forthright fashion with the
specific language of R.C. § 119.11, providing appeal from agency rule-
making, which was admittedly a quasi-legislative function. However, the
court's opinion never clearly focuses on this question, maintaining only
that, "We doubt that the statute ever gave such authority to the Court
68 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page 1969).
69 Counsel for the Department maintained that the statute imposed strict liability on the
employer for any act of the agent or employee. This interpretation is not readily discernible
from an inspection of the regulation and indeed, the court of appeals rejected that interpreta-
tion. Fortner v. Thomas, No. 8714 (Franklin Co. Ct. App., Dec. 26, 1968).
70 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.11 (Page 1969).
7122 Ohio St. 2d 13, 16, 257 N.E.2d 371, 373 (1970).
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of Common Pleas of Franklin County, and the amendment to Section 4
of Article IV of the Constitution is supportive of that doubt." 72 Despite
the absence of articulated reasons to provide support for the court's
"doubt," the opinion in Fortner concluded that "R.C. 119.11 may not
be employed to obtain judicial review of quasi-legislative proceedings of
administrative officers and agencies ....
Thus, the initial impression given by Fortner is that R.C. § 119.11
has been entirely negated, leaving in its place a void in which no means
of pre-enforcement review is available to parties adversely affected by agen-
cy- rule-making. However, the second holding in Fortner casts some doubt
upon that initial impression, because it is unclear, as it was with Zangerle
before it, which rationale was relied upon by the court to support the
result and why. Fortner had never been subjected to the application of
the amended regulation. This state of affairs formed the basis for the
court's- second holding regarding justicability. The court stated:
It has become settled judicial responsibility for courts to refrain from giv-
ing opinions on abstract propositions and to avoid the imposition by judg-
ment of premature declarations or advice upon potential controversies. 74
Furthermore, it was the court's contention that R.C. § 119.11 could not
be "used as a method of challenging the lawfulness of an administrative
regulation in a vacuum....-
The possibility of negating use of R.C. § 119.11 is one logical result
of the Fortner holding. However, as the concurring opinion readily rec-
ognized, the statute could well have been specifically intended as a means
of appeal from detisions in quasi-legislative proceedings. This inference
is possibile because once a rule is enforced, R.C. § 119.12 provides the
basis upon which a party would appeal the rule's validity-an appeal from
a quasi-judicial action. Therefore, the concurring opinion noted "I can
conceive of no situation other than the review of a quasi-legislative pro-
ceeding to which § 119.11 would be relevant."76  The concurring opinion
then went on to suggest:
Since I perceive the purpose for R.C. § 119.11 . . . in part, to be an at-
tempt, to grant jurisdiction to review quasi-legislative proceedings and
since such a grant is prohibited by the actual controversy requirement as
contained in the Constitution and as construed by this court, I believe that
72 Id. at 17, 257 N.E.2d at 373. "[Oinly upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence
of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review." Abbott Lab-
oratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967), quoting Rusk v. Corr, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80(1962); L JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION 336 (1965).
73 22 Ohio St. 2d 13, 19, 257 N.E.2d 371, 375 (1970).
74 22 Ohio St. 2d at 14, 257 N.E.2d at 372.
75 22 Ohio St. 2d at 17, 257 N.E.2d at 373.
7622 Ohio St. 2d at 21, 257 N.E.2d at 376.
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there is no cognizable way to avoid holding R.C. 119.11 unconstitutional
insofar as judicial review of quasi-legislative rules is involved.77
However, Fortner does not expressly hold R.C. § 119.11 unconstitutional.
Indeed, one could argue that if the court believed that the statute conferred
upon the courts more power than was constitutionally permissible, by
granting the power to review quasi-legislative acts, it would have done
one of two things. Either it would have expressly declared R.C. §
119.11 unconstitutional, as suggested by the concurring opinion, or it
would have followed the statute and voiced displeasure for doing so to
signal the legislature to repeal the statute. Instead the court did neither
of these things and left itself open to the charge that it had, in effect,
substituted its judgment for that of the legislature, in violation of the doc-
trine of separation of powers. As a result, a question concerning the con-
stitutional status of R.C. § 119.11 and its availability to a challenger per-
sists after Fortner.78
Since the plaintiff in Fortner was held to lack standing to challenge the
rule, the possibility remained that the case could and would be distin-
guished on that ground in subsequent litigation where a plaintiff in fact
had standing. Furthermore, despite the concurring opinion's inability to
conjure up an appropriate situation where R.C. § 119.11 would be applica-
ble, such a situation seems entirely feasible. If an overbroad and vague
rule were promulgated by an agency and that rule were self-executing,
a challenger of the rule would have the requisite standing because the
passage of the rule would cause injury to the plaintiff. The court would
then be faced with alternatives of either following the first rationale in
Fortner and rendering R.C. § 119.11 entirely inoperative or retreating
from that rationale and allowing the challenge to rule-making under R.C.
§ 119.11. However, when finally confronted with such a case, the court
at the same time grasped both and neither of these options, and a third
"alternative" appeared. 9
77 22 Ohio St. 2d at 22, 257 N.E.2d at 376.
78One final point should be made. Rules promulgated by state agencies must comport
with various requirements laid out in Chapter 119. These requirements include notice,
a hearing, and the taking of evidence. These are clearly elements contained in the concept
of due process. Furthermore, these elements are also the elements the court in Kelly claimed
were the basis for having an adjudicatory hearing - i.e., a quasi-judicial proceeding. Had
the Kelly test been applied here as it was in Kelly, and had the court focused on the manner
of promulgating a rule as it did in Kelly, all rule-making by state agencies under Chapter
119 would have to be quasi-judicial in nature and therefore appealable. However, perhaps
to its credit, but certainly to an increase of confusion over what constitutes a quasi-legislative
proceeding, the court focused on the agency's function, that of rule-making. Therefore, despite
the formalities attending that function and the result in Kelly, the Fortner opinion focused
on the function being performed, and not on the procedure used to perform it, to make
the distinction between quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial agency actions.
79This third "alternative" is the Ohio Declaratory Judgment Act. OHIO Rjkv. CODE
ANN. ch. 2721 (Page Supp. 1972).
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2. Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Commission of Ohio'O
In this case the Liquor Control Commission adopted a Regulation LCc-
1-73, purporting to control beer prices and the manner and amount of
price differential between manufacturers and wholesalers and between
manufacturers and retailers. The regulation was self-executing in that,
for example, on the effective date the regulation controlled existing pricing
and marketing systems, forcing a state-wide change. It also limited further
price changes which the court found resulted in economic loss and adverse-
ly affected business operations." A violation could result in either the
suspension or revocation of a license; furthermore it was clear that the
Department intended to and would enforce the regulation. 2 The plain-
tiffs, nine breweries manufacturing and distributing beer in Ohio, appealed
the regulation under R.C. § 119.11 and R.C. § 119 .12,3 and brought an
action under the Ohio Declaratory Judgment Act.84
It must be stressed that for purposes of deciding the applicability of
R.C. § 119.11, the court had before it a situation which left no doubt
that there was a case or controversy and that plaintiffs dearly had standing.
This regulation was self-executing, and the court recognized that they were
"not asked to adjudicate rights and obligations in a 'vacuum.' "8 However,
despite the existence of the above-mentioned factual situation, the court
nonetheless held Fortner dispositive of the issue of judicial review pursuant
to R.C. § 119.11.86 Therefore, Burger Brewing dearly sounds the final
death knell for that section.
Burger Brewing could also have been the final point in the unhappy
life span of pre-enforcement judicial review of agency rule-making in Ohio.
However, the court in Burger Brewing did not allow the execution. It
held that pre-enforcement judicial review could be obtained in this instance
through the Declaratory Judgment Act, thereby distinguishing Fortner.87
The court stated that:
Relief sought in the nature of a declaratory judgment is distinctly differ-
ent from the relief sought in an. administrative review .... It is the very
purpose of declaratory judgment actions to provide a determination as to
the validity of a statute, ordinance, or agency regulation.88
Thus, while reaffiaming prior decisions limiting appeals from agency rule-
80 34 Ohio St. 2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 261 (1973).
8 1 Brief for Appellant at 5.
82Id.
8 8 The lower court found § 119.12 not applicable and this question was not presented
on appeal. 34 Ohio St. 2d 93, 94, 296 N.E.2d 261, 263 (1973).
84 Declaratory Judgment Act, OHIo REv. CODE ANN. ch. 2721.
85 Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St. 2d 13, 17, 275 N.E.2d 371, 373 (1970).
86 34 Ohio St. 2d 93, 96, 296 N.E.2d 261, 263 (1973).
87 Id. at 99, 296 NB.2d at 265-66.
88 Id, 296 N.E2d at 265-66.
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making, Burger Brewing suggests a new vehicle, the Declaratory Judgment
Act, to do exactly what is precluded under the APA. The court expended
little effort attempting to indicate how any difference between the two
modes of review would justify this result. And aside from the court's
pronouncement that there was a difference, no clear reasoning is presented
to delineate the logical path to the court's conclusion.
After assuming that there is a distinction, the Burger Brewing opinion
listed three elements as prerequisites for obtaining a declaratory judgment:
(1) a real controversy between the parties;
(2) a controversy which is justiciable in character; and
(3) a situation where speedy relief is necessary to preserve the rights of
the parties.89
These elements were found to exist in Burger Brewing. However, what
is more interesting is that they are the elements of justiciability announced
as early as Zangerle and found lacking in Fortner. In fact the inference
that the presence of these three elements would allow the use of Revised
Code § 119.11 to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the common
pleas court was possible from Fortner. Furthermore, no mention is made
in Burger Brewing of the fact that the rule-making functions remain quasi-
legislative in nature, despite the means used to review those functions.
If the court was engaged in maintaining what it considered to be the
consistency of precedent, the Burger Brewing opinion ought to be viewed
as a tortured effort to avoid seeming to overrule precedent and yet to indi-
cate the existence of a remedy for irreparable injury. Not only did Burger
Brewing affirm Fortner, it also clarified that Fortner was intended to pro-
hibit appeals from rule-making under Revised Code § 119.11, even when
justiciability, standing, and ripeness were present. However, at the same
time, Burger Brewing could be read to overrule Fortner, because Burger
Brewing allows pre-enforcement challenges to rule-making via the Declara-
tory Judgment Act. Why pre-enforcement review of quasi-legislative ac-
tions is proper under Revised Code § 2721.03 but not permissible under
Revised Code § 119.11 is left unexplained.90 This procedure sidesteps the
issues raised in the concurring opinion in Fortner. Indeed, if in fact the
court believed that R.C. § 119.11 is an unconstitutional delegation of pow-
er, an explicit indication of that belief would better enable the court to
deal with demands for the review of agency action. However, in allow-
ing review by way of a declaratory judgment of quasi-legislative proceed-
ings, the court has left the dear implication that such a judicial function is
not necessarily unconstitutional. Therefore, the question arises: Why has
89 Id. at 97, 296 N.E.2d at 264.
90 "Any person interested under a . . .rule as defined in section 119.01 of the Revised
Code, municipal ordinance ... may have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under such . . . rule, ordinance . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or
other legal relations thereunder." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2721.03 (Page Supp. 1972).
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the court chosen the declaratory judgment as the means to review agency
rule-making?
There can be no doubt that in Burger Brewing the court properly
granted relief, as it was faced with plaintiffs who had suffered irreparable
injury. Furthermore, it is suggested that the method which it used to extri-
cate itself from its prior consistent precedent may provide an effective
means for aggrieved parties to obtain pre-enforcement judicial review of
agency rule-making. After Burger Brewing an individual can, presumably
with court approval, use the Declaratory Judgment Act without having first
to decide whether to comply with a rule or to defy it and face possible penal-
ties. Perhaps the mechanism for effective pre-enforcement review has been
uncovered. Certainly pre-enforcement review is needed because it has the
advantages of providing for a central source of regulatory interpretation,
of providing certainty in business and agency planning, and of avoiding
unnecessary costs of compliance by affected partiesY It remains, of course,
to be seen if these goals can be effectively achieved by use of the declara-
tory judgment procedure.
V. THE "NEW" APPROACH:
THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT92
The pronouncement in Burger Brewing that rule-making can be chal-
lenged via the declaratory judgment route and not by R.C. § 119.11, sug-
gests that a principled distinction can be made between the two modes of
pre-enforcement review. Initially it was thought that a declaratory judg-
ment could only be used if no other court proceeding was possible. How-
ever, the Declaratory Judgment Act was later interpreted more liberally
and can now be used despite the availability of alternative remedies. How-
ever, its use under such circumstances is limited to the exercise of sound
discretion by the court where the court feels speedy relief is necessary.9"
The Act was amended in 1961 to specifically provide for declaratory judg-
ments of "rules" as defined by R.C. § 119.11. Section 2721.03 also pro-
vides for review of municipal ordinances. To that extent the allowance
of a declaratory judgment by the Burger Brewing court was but the firstjudicial recognition of an already available legislative remedy.
The most basic difference between a R.C. § 2721.03 proceeding and
a R.C. § 119.11 proceeding is that the former is not an appeal but rather
a plenary action. This means that the challenger of a rule will now be
able to present his objections to the rule in court, whereas under R.C.
9 1Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 (1967); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967).
92 OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2721.03 (Page Supp. 1972).
93 American Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Jones, 152 Ohio St. 287, 89 N.E.2d 301 (1949);
Radaszewski v. Keating, 141 Ohio St. 489, 49 N.E.2d 167 (1943); Schaefer v. First Natl
Bank, 134 Ohio St. 511, 18 NZ.2d 263 (1938).
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§ 119.11 he was limited to the record made at the agency hearing. 4 While
this opportunity will not necessarily help or hinder a challenger, it may
have an impact on the presentation of evidence by the agency at the public
hearing. Taking, for the moment, a pessimistic view, it may be that the
existence of the declaratory judgment remedy will encourage an agency
not to present evidence supportive of its view as to the enactment, amend-
ment, or recission of a rule or regulation in order to better survive court
review in a dose situation. However, since it is not dear that agencies
have presented evidence of their viewpoint in the past, this may not be
a step backwards.
Despite the absence of the necessity or requirement to do so under
Chapter 119, some agency justification ought to appear on the record to
survive a challenge under § 119.11. The limited treatment given this
issue under Chapter 119 is illustrated by the following:
The administrative agency has no obligation to support the reasonableness
of its proposal-except in the sense of the practical desirability of rebut-
tal, especially in the light of the limitation on evidence on an appeal
under Section 119.11, Revised Code. ...
... The former [R.C. § 119.11] does not require the court to affimative-
ly find that the action is supported by reliable, probative and substantial
evidence. It requires only that the court determine whether the procedure
was proper and whether the rule adopted is reasonable and lawful.95
However, the test the court was to use to determine the reasonableness
or lawfulness of the rules is not set forth. In any event, it is clear that
under an action for declaratory judgment there is no incentive for an agen-
cy to introduce evidence at the hearing to show that the rule is reasonable
or lawful. This in turn seems to subvert the public participation aspect
of the hearing required by R.C. § 119.03,"' whereby the agency would
subject its rationale to public scrutiny.
It is difficult to state with precision what the standard will be under
a declaratory judgment action, but perhaps it wilt be different. In Edge
v. Morraine,7 plaintiff challenged a denial by the city council to change
an existing zoning ordinance. The following standard was applied:
The wisdom of a zoning ordinance and its relation to public health, safe-
ty, morals and to general welfare is, in the first instance, left to the judg-
9 4 1n re Appeal from Bd. of Liquor Control, 103 Ohio App. 517, 146 N.E.2d 309 (1957);
Maggiore v. Board of Liquor Control, 115 Ohio App. 131, 184 N.E.2d 248 (1961); In re Bd.
of Liquor Control's Amendments, 115 Ohio App. 243, 184 N.E.2d 767 (1961); Long v. Di-
vision of Watercraft, 118 Ohio App. 369, 195 N.E.2d 128 (1963).
95 In re Bd. of Liquor Control's Amendments, 115 Ohio App. 243, 245, 184 N.E.2d 767, 768
(1961), quoted with approval in Long v. Division of Watercraft, 118 Ohio App. 396, 370,
195 N.E.2d 128, 129 (1963).
16 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 119.03 (Page 1969).
97 283 N.E.2d 219 (Montgomery County C.P. 1970).
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ment and discretion of the legislative body which creates it and judicial
judgment is not to be substituted for legislative judgment in any case
where the validity of the zoning ordinance is fairly debatable. . . More-
over, the Plaintiff has the burden of proving that an ordinance is unrea-
sonable and arbitrary by clear and convincing evidence where he seeks a
declaration of its invalidity.98
In Edge, plaintiff failed to meet that burden, and the council's action was
upheld. The standard enunciated above may be just another way of phras-
ing the substanti~a-evidence rule. This rule predominates in both state
and federal courts, "9 and it is logical to expect that it would be adopted
by the Ohio courts.
A second distinction between appeal under R.C. § 119.11 and review
pursuant to R.C. § 2721.03 is that the latter does not operate as a stay
of the effective date of the agency rule. This factor may have been the
prime motivation for the distinction made in Burger Brewing. Appeal uni
der R.C. § 119.11 had the effect of staying the implementation of the chal-
lenged rule. This in turn had the effect of delaying the implementation of
the rule in Fortner for four years and in Burger Brewing for three years.
However, such delay will no longer automatically occur in an action for a
declaratory judgment. A plaintiff will now undoubtedly have to accom-
pany his petition with a request for injunctive relief consisting of a tem-
porary restraining order. In turn the courts will thus have more leeway
and discretion to individually examine the merits of the challenge and make
a preliminary determination as to the rule's legality. While such flexibility
is desirable, once again the court has subverted the legislative judgment
and substituted its own. For where the presumption was dearly in favor
of the challenger under R.C. § 119.11, inasmuch as the rule was automati-
cally stayed, the use of the Declaratory Judgment Act will reverse that pre-
sumption in favor of the immediate implementation of the rule unless
plaintiff obtains a temporary restraining order.
Assuming that the court's decision to negate the automatic stay was
a rational decision to prevent undue interference with agency operations
in enforcing its rules, it does not automatically follow that this was a
sufficient reason to reverse the presumption. Indeed, the argument was
made to the United States Supreme Court that "to permit resort to the
courts in this type of case may delay or impede effective enforcement of
the Act." 100  Although this contention was made in an appeal under the
Federal APA which did not "by itself stay the effectiveness of the chal-
lenged regulation,"''1 1 the court noted that
981d. at 223-24.
99 K. DAVIS, AIMINISTRATmV LAW TExT § 29.01 (3d ed. 1972).
100 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 154 (1967).
101 Id. at 155.
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if the agency believes that a suit of this type will significantly impede en-
forcement or will harm the public interest, it need not postpone enforce-
ment of the regulation and may oppose any motion for a judicial stay on
the part of those challenging the regulation. . . . It is scarcely to be
doubted that a court would refuse to postpone the effective date of an
agency action if the government could show, as it made no effort to do
here, that delay would be detrimental to the public health or safety.1
02
If it was the "stay" feature of R.C. § 119.11 that the Burger Brewing court
was concerned about, that concern could have been effectively assuaged by
the above procedure.
One final distinction between R.C. § 119.11 and R.C. § 2721.03 is
that judicial review pursuant to a declaratory judgment action is left to
"the sound discretion" of the court.'0 3  However, the courts no doubt will
be limited in their discretion by the tests enunciated in Burger Brewing for
allowing such an action.' Under the Burger Brewing tests, a plaintiff
must have standing and must be in danger of suffering irreparable harm,
thus necessitating speedy relief. Despite these guidelines, however, "sound
discretion" by its very nature defies precise definition, and in the final anal-
ysis, it is the wise use of this sound discretion which will determine the
efficacy of the declaratory judgment action to achieve effective pre-enforce-
ment review of agency rules. In addition, it is suggested-with the limi-
tation of discretion-that the clear signal of Burger Brewing is for an
aggrieved party to use this mode of review, as Burger Brewing indicates
the court's recognition that pre-enforcement review is desirable.
Therefore, although there are slight differences between an appeal un-
der R.C. § 119.11 and review under R.C. § 2721.03, those differences
do not answer the question of why R.C. § 2721.03 is permissible and
R.C. § 119.11 is not. However, regardless of the absence of a dear dis-
tinction, the current reality is that R.C. § 119.11 is no longer viable "
and R.C. § 2721.03 is. It is suggested that this result is a realization by the
Burger Brewing court that a very real need exists to provide an effective
and timely means for an aggrieved party to get pre-enforcement review
of agency rules. It is certainly probable that the court recognizes the need
to provide certainty in business regulations and the need to remove the
"chilling effect" attendant to some regulations. Burger Brewing may also
be an implicit recognition of the potential for abuse by unchecked and
not easily reviewed governmental agencies, and ought to represent at least
102 d. at 156.
103 Smith v. Municipal Civil Service Comm'n, 158 Ohio St. 401, 109 N.E.2d 507 (1952);
American Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Jones, 152 Ohio St. 287, 89 N.E.2d 301 (1949);
Kadaszewski v. Keating, 141 Ohio St. 489, 49 N.E.2d 167 (1943); Schaefer v. First Natel
Bank of Findlay, 134 Ohio St. 511, 18 N.E.2d 263 (1938).
104 See text at note 89 supra.
105 It may still be possible to challenge procedural irregularities under OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. § 119.11.
[Vol. 34
NOTES
a tentative step toward providing the needed check and easier review. At
the same time the decision avoids being tied down with the traditionally
troublesome problems regarding the court's role in review of agency ac-
tions. Given the history of administrative review in Ohio, and spurred,
perhaps, by the suggestion in the concurring opinion in Fortner, the court
as a matter of technique may have been inclined to embrace an alternative
mode of pre-enforcement review rather than to attempt to overrule 30
years of precedent.
The implications and potential uses of Burger Brewing are not limited
to the area of state administrative agency action. Burger Brewing can ef-
fectively be applied to the area of municipal agencies as well, as R.C. §
2721.03 is equally applicable to that area and offers a way to bypass the
Kelly-Haught dilemma. If the Kelly-Haught problem, as well as the prob-
lem raised by Fortner, can be obviated through the use of a declaratory
judgment action, then Burger Brewing does indeed constitute a significant
advance in the area of the judicial review of governmental agency actions.
However, whatever the motivation for the result reached by the court in
Burger Brewing the court should quickly dispel the residual confusion left
by that opinion. The court should, at the earliest opportunity, delineate
specific standards and allocate the burdens of proof necessary to the use of
the declaratory judgment procedure. The time has come (perhaps it is
long passed) to end the ambiguity which has plagued this area of the law
and to formulate a procedure which gives certain and timely relief to a
person aggrieved by agency action.
VI. CONCLUSION
To be sure, governmental agencies at whatever level play an important
role in our society. They provide expertise in their various fields and
are responsible for the day-to-day regulation and diverse activities to which
the legislature cannot directly attend. Therefore, they have been delegated
power to promulgate rules, and to enact and implement orders, ordinances,
and regulations. However, there must be an effective and timely way
to review abuses of power by these agencies. In the area of review of
municipal actions, the courts, by imprecisely distinguishing between quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial acts, have made it next to impossible for a
person aggrieved to know how to proceed to invoke court jurisdiction
and state a claim for relief. They have forced a party to assume the
substantial burden of having to either guess as to the label the court will
give to a municipal action or to combine numerous actions in a costly
and time-consuming effort to ensure an avenue of relief. In the area of
review of state administrative agency actions, the uncertainty just described
is present to a lesser degree. However, here the challenger's problem
is compounded by the lack of timely relief when irreparable injury has
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been suffered. The Burger Brewing opinion, despite lack of clarity, has
taken a first step towards much-needed change in both the municipal agency
area and the state administrative agency area. Burger Brewing recognizes
that the time has come for the judiciary to act, and it signals a step in the
right direction. If past treatment by the courts is any indication of the
future, Burger Brewing dearly does not mean that these "headless" agen-
cies are to be decapitated by unchecked access to the courts to challenge
agency actions. However, Burger Brewing should mean that the possibil-
ity of giving the agency a haircut when and if needed is now going to be
much easier than before.
Charles . Kampinski
